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NOTES

TRANSNATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY AS A FACTOR IN CHOICE
OF LAW ANALYSIS
In the adjudication of a transnational controversy' courts may find
that the dispositive choice of law doctrines' unequivocally direct the
application of foreign law that is repugnant or obnoxious to the forum's sense of justice and morality. In these instances, United States
courts will invoke the concept of public policy, a device which permits
the forum to avoid application of pernicious foreign law.3 The classic
justification for invoking public policy in choice of law analysis is Justice Cardozo's formulation that application of the foreign law would
"violate some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the commonweal." 4
1. Transnational controversies arise whenever states assert competing claims of competence to resolve issues or regulate transactions which affect a variety of geographical
areas. These disputes may involve various combinations of persons and property of diverse national affiliations. See, e.g., M. McDouGAL & M. REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 1271 (1981).
2. Public policy as a factor in choice of law analysis is an exception to the practice of
resolving choice of law questions with policy neutral choice of law rules. These mechanistic rules, stated in latin phrases which generally begin with the words lex loci, meaning
"law of the place," are identified with the original Restatement of Conflict of Laws. For
example, the lex loci delicti rule requires that tort claims be governed by the state where
the last event necessary to make an actor liable takes place. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (1934). The lex loci celebrationis rule resolves questions concerning the validity of a marriage by referring to the law of the place where the marriage
was celebrated. Id. § 121. Similarly, the lex loci contractus rule signals application of the
law of the place of contracting to determine the validity and effect of a promise. Id. §

332. See also 1 DICEY

AND MORRIS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS

26-27 (J. Morris, 10th ed.

1980).
3. See Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARv. L. REV. 173, 183
(1933); 2 E. RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 558-60 (1947). See also
generally Paulsen & Sovern, "Public Policy" in the Conflict of Laws, 56 COLUM. L. REV.
969 (1956). Public policy has most often been asserted as a consideration in cases involving either the validity of a marriage or divorce, or the enforcement of a tax or penal
statute. These issues are regarded as being peculiarly reflective of domestic policy. Moreover, it is undesirable that the rights, duties, disabilities and immunities conferred or
imposed by the family relationship should constantly change as members of a family
cross state boundaries during temporary absences from their domicile. Id.
4. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York, 224 N.Y. 99, 111 (1918). Loucks concerned an employee who was killed in Massachusetts as a result of the negligence of
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Discussion of "justice" and "good morals," however, tends to lack
analytical bite. The actual practice of courts in applying the public policy exception therefore has been the object of much criticism.5 Choice
of law determinations relying on the public policy exception have been
particularly susceptible to charges that they are primarily motivated
by parochialism on the part of the decisionmakers.6 In exploring the
validity of this allegation, Professors Paulsen and Sovern reviewed
United States conflicts cases applying the public policy exception and
found that "[tihe overwhelming number of cases which have rejected
foreign law on public policy grounds are cases with which the forum
had some important connection." '7 The public policy exception is thus
seen as a species of interest analysis."
In the cases reviewed by Paulsen and Sovern, courts avoided application of foreign law by first identifying a connection between the
controversy and the forum, and then declaring that this connection
justified application of forum law.9 Rather than discussing why the foother employees of the defendant. Id. at 102. The deceased was survived by a wife and
two children, residents of New York, who sought damages. Id. The laws of New York and
Massachusetts concerning employer liability for employee negligence were in direct conflict. The relevant Massachusetts statute permitted an action to be brought against a
corporation for damages arising from the negligence of the corporation's employees. Id.
New York law did not permit such actions. Id.
Holding that it was not against forum policy for a New York court to enforce a right
of action granted by a Massachusetts statute, Justice Cardozo reasoned:
If aid is to be withheld here, it must be because the cause of action in its nature
offends our sense of justice or menaces the public welfare ....

[T]here is noth-

ing in the Masachusetts statute that outrages the public policy of New York
.... [T]he fundamental policy is that there shall be some atonement for the
wrong.
Id. at 110-11.
5. See, e.g., Paulsen & Sovern, supra note 3, at 970-71; Beach, Uniform Interstate
Enforcement of Vested Rights, 27 YALE L.J. 656, 662 (1918) (referring to employment of
the exception as an "intolerable affection of superior virtue").
6. See Paulsen & Sovern, supra note 3, at 973; Goodrich, Public Policy in Law of
Conflicts, 36 W. Va. L.Q. 156, 170 (1930).
7. Paulsen & Sovern, supra note 3, at 981.
8. Interest analysis has largely supplanted the lex loci approach of the First Restatement. See supra note 2. Under interest analysis, courts weigh the respective interests of
jurisdictions involved in a controversy to determine which jurisdiction has the strongest
connection with the dispute, and therefore should have its law applied. See, e.g.,
Ehrenzweig, A Counter-Revolution in Conflicts Law? From Beale to Covers, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 377 (1966).
9. See, e.g., Mackey v. Pettijohn, 6 Kan. App. 57, 49 P. 636 (1897) (property located
in Kansas; situs law applied); Chambers v. Consolidated Garage Co., 210 S.W. 565 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1919), afl'd, 111 Tex. 293, 231 S.W. 1022 (1921) (Texas law applicable because
the purchaser was a resident of Texas); Hutchinson v. Ross, 262 N.Y. 381, 187 N.E. 65
(1933) (trust property located in New York, situs law controlled); Forgan v. Bainbridge,
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rum's connection with a particular case justified rejection of the choice
of law result mandated by ordinary analysis, the courts retreated to a
public policy platitude.'
Judicial failure to focus on the purpose and role of the public policy exception and to structure a clear and analytical method for employing it, have earned the concept a reputation as a device of judicial
inertia." Paulsen and Sovern concluded that "[t]he principal vice of
the public policy concepts is that they provide a substitute for analysis.
The concepts stand in the way of careful thought, of discriminating
distinctions, and of true policy development in the conflict of laws."' 2
As currently applied, the public policy exception both inadequately accounts for all the interests implicated in the transnational controversy
and obscures the purpose for invocation of the public policy concept.
The failure of the current conception of public policy to provide a
structured, analytical framework for choice of law purposes leaves
courts to apply either a platitudinous public policy exception, or hoary
and mechanistic choice of law rules such as the lex loci automatons.' s
These approaches ignore interests that demand recognition under a
structured public policy exception. The purpose of this note is to propose that a reformulated concept of public policy-one adopting a
structured, analytical framework and recognizing transnational interests-would yield a system of choice of law analysis that is adequately
responsive to the challenges and demands of the world community.
Drawing upon and extending American and European conflict of laws
theories, this note will suggest that transnational public policy concerns 4 are a valid factor in choice of law analysis and that such con34 Ariz. 408, 274 P. 155 (1928) (Illinois law held applicable to a mortgage granted in
Illinois).
10. See, e.g., Mackey v. Pettijohn, 6 Kan. App. at 60, 49 P. at 637. As justification for
the application of forum law, the Mackey court merely stated: "IT]o allow the rule of
decision in Missouri to prevail here would be to overturn our own policy with respect to
mortgages on personal property." See also Forgan v. Bainbridge, 34 Ariz. at 415, 274 P.
at 158 ("we are not required under the doctrine of comity to enforce similar contracts
according to [a foreign jurisdiction's] rule, when such rule is directly opposed to our own
public policy").
11. Paulsen & Sovern, supra note 3, at 1016.
12. Id.
13. See supra note 2.
14. Transnational public policy concerns are those areas of public interest which
transcend national boundaries, and thus are shared by the world community. See, e.g., S.
WILLIAMS, THE INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PROTECTION OF MOVABLE CULTURAL PROPERTY. (1978). See generally Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened
for signature July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 (the
proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war),
Convention on the High Seas, opened for signature April 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312,
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cerns may have a positive selection role' 5 in choice of law decisionmaking. This probing approach would displace the purely negative,"6
overriding functions of public policy illustrated in many decisions and
result in a more rational choice of law analysis.
PUBLIC POLICY SOURCES AND EFFECTS

A.

The United States Approach

A relatively recent case involving international art theft illustrates
the failure of courts to recognize transnational interests in choice of
law analysis. In Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon,' the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York considered cross-motions for summary judgment in an action brought by a
German Government art museum seeking the return of two Dtirer 8
paintings stolen from Germany at the end of World War II.19 Elicofon
claimed ownership of the paintings based on twenty years of uninterrupted possession, from his good faith purchase in Brooklyn in 1946
until his discovery of their identity in 1966.20 Ruling on standing,2' limitations of actions and choice of law questions, the court granted the
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and ordered Elicofon to de2
liver the paintings to the Kunstsammlungen.
The district court superficially considered whether New York or
German law should be applied to determine whether Elicofon had acquired title to the paintings. The court recited the choice of law rule
"that questions relating to the validity of a transfer of personal propT.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (the high seas should remain open to all nations),
Antarctica Treaty, opened for signature Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780,
402 U.N.T.S. 71 (Antarctica should continue to be used exclusively for peaceful
purposes).
15. See infra notes 160-69 and accompanying text.
16. Id.
17. 536 F. Supp. 829 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
18. Albrecht DfIrer (1471-1528) was a German painter and wood engraver. See M.
LEVY, DORER 18 (1964).
19. 536 F. Supp. at 830.
20. Id. at 833.
21. The court described how the Kunstsammlungen derived standing to sue:
On April 14, 1969, retroactive to January 1, 1969, the Minister of Culture of the
German Democratic Republic, issued an order conferring juridical personality
upon the former Staatliche Kunstsammlungen, which thereafter became known
as the Kunstsammlungen zu Weimer [the Weimar Art Collection], a status
which under East German Law entitled the Kunstsammlungen to maintain suit
for return of the Durers.
Id. at 832.
22. Id. at 858-59.
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erty are governed by the law of the state where the property is located
at the time of the alleged transfer."2 Even though the paintings were
stolen in Germany,2 4 the court determined that New York law should
be applied since the paintings were located in New York at the time
they were sold." The court also referred to the "significant relationship" test of the Second Restatement.2 6 Noting that the Ddirer paintings were described as "the most important pieces of art of the Land of
Thuringia 2 7 and "the most valuable possessions of the Land of Thuringia," 2 the court nonetheless held that "Germany's 'connection with
the controversy' is not sufficient 'to justify displacing the rule of lex
loci delictus.' "29 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this
choice of law determination "substantially for the reasons stated in the
district court's opinion."30
The superficiality of the district court's choice of law analysis begs
criticism. It is difficult to understand how New York's fortuitous relationship to the paintings could be considered more significant than
Germany's relationship to them. The protection and preservation of
cultural property is a national public interest in the sense that each
23. 536 F. Supp. at 845-46 (citing Wyatt v. Fulrath, 16 N.Y.2d 169, 264 N.Y.S.2d 233;
211 N.E.2d 637 (1965); Zendman v. Harry Winston, Inc., 305 N.Y. 180; 111 N.E.2d 871
(1953); Hutchison v. Ross, 262 N.Y. 381; 187 N.E. 65 (1933); Goetschius v. Brightman,
245 N.Y. 186; 156 N.E. 660 (1927); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 246
(1971)).
24. 536 F. Supp. at 833-39.
25. Id. at 846. In diversity cases, federal courts apply the conflict of laws rules that
would be applied by the courts of the state in which the federal court is sitting. See
Klaxon v. Stentor Electric Mfg., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
26. Section 222 of the Second Restatement enunciates the general rule for determination of choice of law questions:
The interests of the parties in a thing are determined, depending upon the circumstances, either by the "law" or [by] the "local law" of the state which, [with
respect) to the particular issue, has the most significant relationship to the

thing and the parties (emphasis supplied).
In addition, comment (a) to § 246 provides that "[tihe state where a chattel is situated
has the dominant interest in determining the circumstances under which an interest in
the chattel will be transferred by adverse possession or by prescription." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1969), cited in Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. at 846.
27. 536 F. Supp. at 834-35 (citing Letter from Dr. D.W. Scheiding, Director of the
Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar, to Thuringian Ministry of Education (June 27, 1945)).
28. Id. at 835 (citing Letter from Dr. D.W. Scheiding, Director of the Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar, to Thuringian Ministry of Education (July 21, 1945)).
29. 536 F. Supp. at 846 (citing Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 129, 335
N.Y.S.2d 64, 71, 286 N.E.2d 454, 458 (1972)). The lex loci delicti choice of law rule mandates the application of the law of the place where the tort was committed. See supra
note 2. In Elicofon, the court concluded that wrongful possession of the paintings occurred in New York. 546 F. Supp. at 831.
30. 678 F.2d 1150, 1160 (2d Cir. 1982).
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nation is vitally concerned with the preservation of its own cultural
heritage.3 ' Thus, Germany's interest in the Diirer paintings, its cultural
property, should have given Germany a greater interest in the adjudication of their ownership. 2 In addition, there is a transnational interest in cultural property because all nations share a common interest in
preserving the aggregate cultural heritage of the world community."
Under a structured public policy analysis,3 4 these transnational interests would be recognized and considered in determining which law to
apply. In Elicofon, these interests should have been weighed against
those of the New York forum in order to determine which law should
govern. This balancing of interests would ensure that an interest based
on fortuitous contacts would not blithely obscure an interest of transnational dimensions.
B.

The European Perspective

Courts in the United States have failed to delineate the purposes
and roles of the public policy exception" and have tended to employ
the exception to further domestic concerns at the expense of foreign
and transnational interests. 3 6 These faults could be remedied by adoption of certain theories advanced by European choice of law scholars.
These scholars have developed a structured concept of public policy
31. This interest is reflected in screening regulations which empower the government
of the country of origin to decide whether or not a particular work of art should be
allowed to leave its borders. Under English law, before an export license is issued, an
expert decides how closely the work of art is connected with English history. The export
license will be withheld if the artwork is of outstanding significance to the study of art,
learning or history. IV LAW ON HIsTomcAL MoNuMErs 153 (1913). Other examples of
this approach are found in French law, see id., and Polish legislation. See B. BURNHAM,
HANDBOOK OF NATIONAL LEGISLATION

(1974). Japan has one of the most effective systems

for protecting cultural property through its specific prohibition of the export of selected
cultural items. For an analysis of the Japanese statutory scheme, see AdministrationFor
Protection of Cultural Properties in Japan (1962).
32. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text. For a comparative study of domestic regulations and international agreements recognizing and protecting interests in cultural property, see S. WILLIAS, supra note 14.
33. See generally Marchisotto, The Protectionof Art in TransnationalLaw, 7 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 689 (1974). See also S. WILAMS, supra note 14.
34. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
35. Paulsen & Sovern, supra note 3, at 981. See Habicht, The Application of Soviet
Laws and the Exception of Public Order, 21 AM. J. Irr'L L. 238, 249 (1927).
36. See generally 1 DIcEY AND MORRIS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 2, at 83
(since domestic law will apply when the right, power, capacity, disability or legal relationship arising under the law of a foreign country is inconsistent with the forum's fundamental public policy, the effect of the doctrine of public policy always is to exclude the
application of otherwise applicable foreign law).
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which distinguishes among types of public policy according to their respective sources and effects.37 Adoption of a more probing public policy
analysis modelled on the European approach would contribute greatly
toward more comprehensible and internationally sensitive choice of
law determinations.
Savigny ss noted that public policy may sometimes operate to bar
an application of foreign law which under ordinary choice of law analysis would be applicable.? Savigny reduced such exceptions to two
classes:
A. Laws of a strictly positive, imperative nature which are
consequently inconsistent with that freedom of application
which pays no regard to the limits of particular states.
B. Legal institutions of a foreign state, of which the existence
is not at all recognized in ours, and which, therefore, have no
claim to the protection of our courts.4
The first class of exceptions rests on either moral or public interest
grounds. 1 For example, Savigny cites "every marriage law which excludes polygamy" and the "laws which restrict the acquisition of immovable property by Jews. '5 These laws, by barring certain classes of
persons from acquiring immovable property and refusing to recognize
certain marital arrangements, implement imperative moral and public
interests of the forum. The second class of exceptions is illustrated by
37. For a survey of the European writings on this structured public policy concept,
see Habicht, supra note 35, at 238, 243-49; Husserl, Public Policy and Ordre Public, 25
VA. L. REv. 37 (1938-39).
38. Friederich Carl von Savigny (1779-1861) founded the older, romantic branch of
the German historical school of law. INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL ScIENCES 21 (1st ed. 1968).
39.

F.

SAVIGNY,

PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE RETROSPECTIVE OPERATION OF

STATUTES (W. Guthrie trans. 2d ed. 1880 & photo. reprint 1972) (English translation of F.
SAVIGNY, 8 SYSTEM DES HEUTIGEN ROEMISCHEN RECHTS (Berlin 1849)). Savigny made his

observations in the context of the German Empire, focusing on the relations between the
individual German states, as well as on the relations between the particular states and
the German Empire. He also refers to the Roman Empire as support for his theory. Id.
at 65.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 65, 77-78.
42. Regarding the first category of exceptions, Savigny contends that if the law of the
forum forbids polygamy, then the judges of the state must refuse the protection of the
law to the polygamous marriages of foreigners who, under the laws of their domicile,
would be entitled to practice polygamy. Similarly, if one state's law forbids Jews to acquire land, the judges of the state may not recognize acquisitions by native Jews or foreign Jews in whose state there is no such prohibition. A similar example is given regarding heretics. Id. at 166-69.
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"[s]lavery, [which] as a legal institution, is foreign to our state, [and is]
not recognized in it."' 3 Any rights and liabilities arising within the context of such institutions would be unenforceable because the forum entirely rejects the institution's legitimacy.
Savigny's sketchy outline for a structured theory of the public policy exception was expanded and clarified by subsequent developments
in the European theory of ordre public. Three categories of ordre public will be discussed in this note: ordre public interne,"" ordre public
45
international
and ordre public universel.4" This tripartite ordre public concept provides a structured framework for public policy analysis
which is based upon the respective sources and effects of different public policy demands.
1.

Ordre Public Interne

Although rules of ordre public interne do not enter into choice of
law analysis, an understanding of this concept is useful in distinguishing the other types of ordre public and in gaining an appreciation of
the full ordre public structure. Ordre public interne refers to "purely
internal [or domestic] rules of an imperative character."4 7 These rules
are a matter of domestic, but not of international, public policy."' The
ordre public interne rule is "imperative" only in the domestic sense
that it "must be applied irrespective of a contrary intention of the parties."49 A rule of ordre public interne is not applicable when foreign
43. The second class of exceptions also operates to supersede the rule of the domicile.
In a state which does not recognize slavery, a Negro slave will not be treated as property
of his master, nor will the general legal incapacity of slaves be acknowledged. Savigny
suggests there are additional examples relating to nobility, bankruptcy and minors. Id. at
65, 79-80, 166-69.
44. See infra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 54-87 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 88-141 and accompanying text.
47. Kahn-Freund, Reflections on Public Policy in the English Conflict of Laws, 39
GROTIUS Soc'y, TRANSACTIONS 39, 41 (1954). See also, e.g., G. MELCHIOR, DIE GRUNDLAGEN
DES DEUTSCHEN INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECHTS 328 (1932) ("Man unterschied einen ordre public interne und einen ordre public international .... Mit 'ordre public interne'
bezeichnet man das zwingende innere Recht im Gegensatz zum nachgiebigen, mit 'ordre
public international' die jenigen Rechtnormen, die auch gegen tiber dem nach den allegemeinen Kollisionsregeln anwendbaren fremden Recht Geltung beanspruchen").
48. Kahn-Freund, supra note 47, at 42. See also, e.g., C. FORSYTH,PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 85 (1981) (modern Roman-Dutch Law of South Africa) ("Moreover, public
policy in the international sense-i.e., the public policy which on occasion excludes foreign law-must be distinguished from internal public policy, the public policy which obtains in cases governed by the lex fori (i.e., law of the forum)").
49. Kahn-Freund, supra note 47, at 41.
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law governs under the operation of ordinary choice of law analysis."
Rules of ordre public interne are thus subordinate to ordinary choice
of law analysis and apply only when a "relevant connecting factor" between the cause of action and the jurisdiction directs application of
that jurisdiction's internal law."
An example of an ordre public interne rule is the doctrine of consideration in the law of contracts. Under English domestic law no one
can, except by deed, make a valid contract without consideration.62
Under Italian law a contract without consideration is perfectly valid. 3
The enforceability of a particular agreement lacking consideration
would depend on whether ordinary choice of law rules directed application of English or Italian law. As an ordre public interne rule, the English doctrine of consideration would only bear upon transactions governed by English law.
2.

Ordre Public International

Ordre public internationalis a public policy doctrine that, despite
its name, is essentially national in character.5 4 The term "international" refers only to the effect of the forum's rules on the policy and
law of other jurisdictions interested in the case. Ordre public international rules form "separate norms" which override general conflict of
laws principles and are applied irrespective of the policy and interests
of a foreign jurisdiction connected with the controversy.5 5 Rules of ordre public internationalmay be said to erect a policy barrier around
6
the forum.
Critics of ordre public internationalhave described the concept as
50. C.
51.
52.
53.

FORSYTH,

supra note 48, at 42.

Kahn-Freund, supra note 47, at 42.
Id. at 41.
Id.

54. See, e.g., 1 H.

BATIFFOL

& P. LAGARDE,

DROIT INTERNATIONAL

Paivp 424 (7th ed.

1981) ("L'expression n'est gu~re heureuse parce que cet ordre public est essentiellement
national et s'oppose pr~cis~ment a l'ordre international r~gulier qui est l'application des
lois comp~tentes. Elle est n6anmoins assez r~pandue et peut s'admettre, toutes reserves
6tant faites sur son sens littoral. II a t4 aussi propos6 de parler d'ordre public [absolu],
sans grande succ~s, vu la relativit4 de la notion. La terminologie la plus scire, quand la
specification parait utile, consiste i viser l'ordre public au sens du droit international
priv6, ou l'ordre public, au sens du droit civil interne") (emphasis in original); Husserl,
supra note 37, at 39; Kahn-Freund, supra note 47, at 41.
55. Kahn-Freund, supra note 47, at 48.

56. See 3 J.P.

NIBoYET, TRAIT9 DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL

PRiv9

FRANCAIS

493 (1944)

("La notion de l'ordre public . . . est une sorte de barri~re fermant le passage au droit
6tranger.")
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"the negation of private international law"57 and "the triumph of nationalism over internationalism, of policy over uniformity or harmony."" s It has also been observed that "inject[ing] national policies
directly into conflicts law, will destroy it. In such event 'international
public order' would embrace all internal laws." 59 These criticisms underscore the need to distinguish between ordre public interne and ordre public international,to ensure that forum law will be applied with
restraint." Without this distinction, the concept of public policy would
comprehend all domestic law and would justify the rejection of all foreign law in conflict with any provision of domestic law.
European conflict of laws scholars offer numerous definitions of ordre public international." Nevertheless, these scholars agree that the
function and effect of ordre public internationalis to reject only foreign law that is in conflict with the forum's fundamental legal principles or moral beliefs.0 2
In an effort to define ordre public international with greater
specificity, some scholars have divided the choice of law exceptions
into two subcategories. Weber" reasoned that the operation of ordre
57. Kahn-Freund, supra note 47, at 57. "Private international law" is another term
for the field of conflict of laws. In order to apply forum law, rules of ordre public international override or negate the choice of law branch of conflict of laws. See Paulsen &
Sovern, supra note 3, at 969.

58. Kahn-Freund, supra note 47, at 57.
59. 1 B. RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 90 (1945).
60. See, e.g., 1 J. CASTEL, CANADIAN CONFLICT OF LAWS 4-5 (1975). Castel explains the
origin and effect of ordre public internationalas follows:
In the conflict of laws, public policy must connote more than local policy as
regards local internal affairs. It is true that internal and external public policy
stem from the national policy of the forum but they differ in many material
respects. Rules affecting public policy and public morals in the internal legal
sphere need not always have the same character in the external sphere ....
Public policy is relative and in conflicts cases represents a national policy operating on the international level.
Id.
61. For a full discussion, see Habicht, supra note 35, at 243-49, reviewing the "Divergences of the Theory About the Exception of Public Order." Habicht cites numerous
definitions including "those legal precepts which evidently and principally serve to guarantee in the state the political, economical, and moral order established by the legislator"; "those laws which safeguard directly and immediately the principles upon which is
based the political organization of a civil society, and, therefore, safeguard the state as a
collective entity"; those laws which "are closely connected with the ethical, religious, economic, and political principles of a state"; "those laws 'qui interessent les droits de la
socitk, sa conservation, son perfectionnement' "; "the penal law, laws concerning the
condition of ownership of immovables, laws of procedure, laws 'de credit public' and laws
protecting good morals." Id.
62. Husserl, supra note 37, at 46-47.
63. H. WEBER, DIE LEHRE VOM ORDRE PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL (1922), cited in Habicht,
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public internationalis founded upon forum principles of good morals
and forum principles of absolute recognition derived from an interpretation of the purpose of forum laws. " Szaszey65 provides a more complete definition of these two categories in his discussion of the concepts
of propter normam externams and propter normam domesticam. 7
The principle of public policy, under propter normam externam,
"bar[s] the application of foreign legal rules where such application
would conflict with the fundamental moral, ideological, social, economic or cultural standards of the forum, its ideas of equity and justice, or its fundamental institutions of the legal order."68 This function
of ordre public internationalis identical to the standard formulated
by Justice Cardozo in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York.6 9 Employing this branch of ordre public international,a court would first
be directed to apply foreign law under ordinary choice of law analysis.70 After an examination of the foreign law, however, the court would
find the foreign law or its effect at odds with fundamental principles of
the forum, and thus reject application of the offensive foreign law. 1
The principle of public policy, under propter normam domesticam, "prevails in the insistence of unconditional, absolute application
of the content of domestic legal rules. . . . [H]ere the stress is on the
absolutely applicable domestic legal rule. ' 7 2 Propter normam domesticam thus functions to impose application of domestic law without resupra note 35, at 247.

64.
65.

Habicht, supra note 35, at 247.

I. SZASZEY, CONFLICTS OF LAWS
(J. Decsenyi trans. 1974).
66. Id. at 96.

IN THE WESTERN, SOCIALIST AND DEVELOPING COUN-

TRIES

67.

Id.

68. Id.
69. 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918). For a brief statement of the case, see supra
note 4.
70. For Justice Cardozo's formulation of propter normam externam, see supra text
accompanying note 4.
71. The practice of invoking public policy to escape application of offensive foreign
legal rules has a long history.
Where nondiscriminatory invocation of foreign "personal" or "real" statutes and
customs seemed unworkable in the growing commerce among the Italian city
foreign "statute odiosa" were rejected in a partly regained discrestates ....
tion of the forum. When in nineteenth century Europe the nationality principle
and vested rights . . . began to arrogate a universal regime based on non-existing superlaws, the forum's ordre public was called in as a corrective. And all
through the history of conflicts law public policy has been used to limit a potentially all-embracing autonomy of the parties.
A. EHRENZWEIG, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: A COMPARATIVE TREATISE ON AMERICAN AND
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS OF LAW, INCLUDING THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 153 (1967).

72.

I. SZASZEY, supra note 65, at 96.
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sort to choice of law analysis or to an appraisal of the foreign law that
might otherwise be applied. Domestic law is summarily applied bein the case is deemed to
cause the particular subject matter involved
73
be exclusively governed by the forum law.
Both functions of ordre public international are illustrated in
Mertz v. Mertz.74 In Mertz, the plaintiff, a New York resident, had
been injured in Connecticut as the result of her husband's alleged negligent operation of a motor vehicle. 75 The defendant husband was also
a New York resident.7" Under Connecticut law, a spouse was permitted
to recover damages for injuries caused by the other spouse's negligent
operation of an automobile," while New York law did not recognize
such suits. 78 The lex loci delicti79 choice of law rule applied in New
York at the time directed application of the law of Connecticut, the
place of the accident.80
In rejecting the application of Connecticut law, the New York
Court of Appeals relied upon two alternative rationales. First, the
court found that the Connecticut law stood in direct contradiction to
the public policy embodied in the New York law prohibiting negligence
actions between spouses.8 " This holding represents ordre public international in its first function, propter normam externam. Finding foreign law applicable under choice of law analysis, the court examined
the foreign law and determined that it violated the fundamental public
policy of New York.8" Based on the "common law doctrine of the
merger of the beings of husband and wife in the unity of marriage, '"83
New York's policy disabled spouses from maintaining an action against
73. The effect of the unconditional application of domestic rules is to bar the use of
foreign law. Szaszey cites as examples of propter normam domesticam "rules which protect individuals against undue influence, exploitation bordering on blackmail, or the extreme restriction of economic freedom." Id. at 98.
74. 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597 (1936).
75. 271 N.Y. at 469, 3 N.E.2d at 597-98.
76. Id.
77. 271 N.Y. at 470, 3 N.E.2d at 598.
78. Id.
79. See supra note 2. The lex loci delicti choice of law rule states that the place of
wrong is in the state where the last event occurs that is necessary to make an actor liable
for the tort, and that the law of the place of wrong determines whether a person has
sustained a legal injury. See RESTATEMENT

(1934).
80.
81.
82.
83.

(FIRST)

271 N.Y. at 469, 3 N.E.2d at 597-98.
271 N.Y. at 470-73, 3 N.E.2d at 598-600.
Id.
271 N.Y. at 469, 3 N.E.2d at 598.
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each other for personal injuries."4 This policy would not defer to otherwise applicable foreign law.
As an alternative rationale, the court stated that the law of no
other state could have an extraterritorial effect altering the status disability imposed by New York in precluding one spouse from suing the
other."5 This alternative rationale is an example of the second function
of ordre public international,propter normam domesticam. New York
characterized the disability attaching to the spousal status as a rule of
absolute application. 8 Regardless of the result under ordinary choice
of law analysis and regardless of the substantive content and effect of
any otherwise applicable foreign law, the policy of the domestically imposed spousal disability would suffer no manipulation by the extraterritorial application of foreign law."
In both of its functions, the ordre public internationalconcept is
concerned with elevating or transforming certain national policies to
international stature in order to override the result of ordinary choice
of law analysis. Ordre public international,as an instrument of judicial decisionmaking, is thus insufficient to embrace truly transnational
interests which do not have their origin in the internal policy of any
given country. This inadequacy of ordre public internationalis remedied by the third category of public policy, ordre public universel.
3.

Ordre Public Universel

This category of public policy, termed propter normam inter gentes praeceptum 8 or ordre public universel,8 9 provides that "the principle of public policy will prevail [over ordinary choice of law analysis] if
the application of a foreign legal rule conflicts with the peremptory
rules of the law of nations, the international commitments of the home
state, or the requirement of justice as generally recognized by the in84. Id.
85. The court of appeals noted that "[tihe law of this state attaches to the marriage
status a reciprocal disability which precludes a suit by one spouse against the other for
personal injuries. It recognizes the wrong but denies remedy for such wrong by attaching
to the spouse a disability to sue." 271 N.Y. at 473.
86.

Id.

87. Id. at 473-74.
The New York disability to sue may perhaps be an anachronistic survival of the
common law rule. Even then, the courts should not transform an anachrony into
an anomaly, and a disability to sue attached by our laws to the person of a wife
becomes an anomaly if another State can confer upon a wife, even though residing here, a capacity to sue in our courts upon a cause of action arising there.
Id. at 474.
88. 1. SzAzSzy, supra note 65, at 96.
89. Id.
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ternational legal community."9 Several British and United States
cases dealing with the effect of wartime decrees issued by the governments of occupied countries provide examples of the recognition and
nonrecognition of ordre public universel interests."
In Lorentzen v. Lydden & Co.,92 the Norwegian Government issued a decree purporting to requisition all ships registered in Norway,
situated outside the area of Norway occupied by an enemy force, and
owned by a company carrying on business in that occupied area.93 Enacted to prevent these ships from coming within the control of the enemy occupier,9 4 this decree gave the Norwegian Minister of Shipping
the power to take over ships under construction outside the occupied
area. The Minister was also authorized to collect claims of the owners
of these ships and to enforce such claims by action.9 5 Pursuant to these
powers, the Minister of Shipping brought an action in England to recover damages arising from the defendant's breach of a contract to
charter a steamship.9 6 The defendants contended that the Minister of
Shipping had no right to collect claims belonging to the owners of the
steamship and that the Norwegian Government could not, by any legislative or executive act, transfer title to claims or other property situ97
ated in England.
The court, through Justice Atkinson, responded:
It seems to me that the English courts are entitled to take into
consideration the following matters: that this is not a confiscatory decree . . . , that England and Norway are engaged together in a desperate war for their existence, and that public
policy demands that effect should be given to this decree ....
90. Id. at 96. See also infra text accompanying notes 99-102.
Szaszey remarks that this may be the only category of public policy to which an
international tribunal may have recourse since ordre public interne and ordre public
international are based on internal, domestic policies of the forum. I. SZASZEY, supra
note 65, at 96. An international tribunal, by its nature, is not bound by the domestic
policy of any particular state. Id.; see I.C.J. STAT. art. 38, para. (1). It is empowered to
adjudicate claims for the benefit of the international community and may apply that
community's policy to the disputes before it. I. SZASZEY, supra note 65, at 96.
Similarly, a national court should resort to ordre public universel when it employs
the public policy exception in cases having transnational dimensions. Id. In these instances, the national court is playing a role similar to that of an international tribunal.
91. See infra notes 92-142 and accompanying text.
92. [1942] 2 K.B. 202.
93. Id. at 203.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 203-04.
96. Id. at 202.
97. Id. at 203.
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where the dictates of policy are so plain, . . . I am entitled to
give effect to this decree. It is not confiscatory, it is in the interests of public policy, and it is in accordance with the comity
of nations.9 8
Although the court failed to offer an analytical definition of the
public policy applied, Lorentzen clearly involves application of the ordre public universel doctrine. 99 Since England and Norway were allies
during the war, recognition and enforcement of the Norwegian decree
by the English courts would reflect an "international commitment" of
England.' The Lorentzen holding may also reflect the belief that recognition and enforcement of a decree that would impede the efforts of
an aggressor occupying another nation's territory was required by "justice as generally recognized by the international legal community."1'0
Under either justification, the ordre public universel concept was invoked to override the otherwise applicable lex situs rule, 102 which
would have directed application of English law and barred enforcement
of the Norwegian decree.
In reaching its decision, the Lorentzen court relied on the reason08
decided
ing in Anderson v. N.V. TransandineHandelmaatschappij,
by the New York State Supreme Court only six months before Lorentzen. Anderson involved the A.1 decree that had been issued by the
Royal Netherlands Government. 0 ' After the Netherlands was invaded
by the enemy in May, 1940, the Royal Netherlands Government, with
the approval of the British Government, exercised its sovereign powers
from London.' 08 In order to prevent property belonging to persons residing in the occupied Netherlands from being used in a manner contrary to the interests of the Netherlands, the government in exile issued the A.1 decree which purported to transfer such property to the
0
state.
In Anderson, the defendant was a Dutch corporation that had retained its domicile in the Netherlands during the enemy occupation
and had deposited certain securities and assets in the United States
98. Id. at 215-16.
99. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
100. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.

101. Id.
102. RESTATEMENT

(FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

§ 49 (1934) ("A chattel is subject to

the jurisdiction of the state within which it is . . .").

103. 289 N.Y. 9, 43 N.E.2d 502 (1942), afj'g mem., 263 A.D. 705, 31 N.Y.S.2d 194
(N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't), aff'g, 28 N.Y.S.2d 547 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1941).
104. 289 N.Y. at 13, 43 N.E.2d at 503.
105. Id.
106. Id.

N.Y.L. SCH. J.

INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 5

before the war. The plaintiff had attached these assets believing that
they belonged to the defendant. The defendant moved to vacate the
to the Netherlands
attachment on the ground that the assets belonged
10 7
Government as a result of the A.1 decree.
The New York State Supreme Court held that the A.1 decree had
effected a transfer of title to the securities and assets from the defendant to the Netherlands Government. Observing that the decree did
not violate the forum's public policy,"'8 the court cited Hilton v.
Guyot'0 9 and found that "the comity of nations" required the foreign
decree to be recognized and enforced. l 0 Accordingly, the defendant's
motion to vacate the attachment was granted.1
In Anderson, the concept of comity served the function of ordre
public universel.1 " Although application of the forum's lex situs
choice of law rule would have permitted the court to disregard the decree, s the court instead chose to enforce the decree as a matter of
"comity of nations. 1 1 4 Like the court in Lorentzen,11 5 the Anderson
court likely preferred not1 1 6to frustrate the efforts of an ally aimed
against a common enemy.
The appellate division unanimously affirmed Anderson without issuing an opinion.11 7 On appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, the
United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York was
granted leave to file "a Suggestion of the Interest of the United States
in the Matter in Litigation." 1 This suggestion provided a certification
by the State Department that the United States Government recognized the Royal Netherlands Government in England as the govern107.
108.

Id.
28 N.Y.S.2d at 553 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1941).

109.
110.
111.

159 U.S. 113 (1895).
28 N.Y.S.2d at 552.
Id. at 560.

112. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
113. For a general discussion of the lex loci rules, see supra note 2. See also supra
note 102.
114. 28 N.Y.S.2d at 552.
115. See supra notes 92-102 and accompanying text.
116. 28 N.Y.S.2d at 553, 560.
If our courts, despite the obvious approval and sanction of the United States
Government, despite international comity, despite the obvious justice and reasonableness of the action taken by the Netherlands, fail to give effect to this
Decree, the property of Netherlands nationals in the United States may be subject to waste, dissipation and a welter of litigation which will serve neither the
ends of justice, nor conform to American public policy.
Id.
117. 263 A.D. 705, 31 N.Y.S.2d 194 (1941), aff'd, 289 N.Y. 9, 43 N.E.2d 502 (1942).
118. 289 N.Y. at 15, 43 N.E.2d at 504, 505.
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ment of the Netherlands. " The court of appeals stated that this certification presented a political question, but maintained that the "scope
and the effect within this State of a decree promulgated by the recognized government" was a judicial question. 2 ' Since the "public policy"
formulated by the State Department "accords with the public policy of
[New York] State,' 121 the court of appeals found it unnecessary to
"consider or decide" whether courts must give effect to the political
public policy embodied in the certification.2 2 In the absence of a conflict between United States and New York policy, the court could
safely reach its policy decision without analyzing the federal/state and
political/judicial question controversies. The lower courts' decisions
of the decree were
recognizing and enforcing the extraterritorial effect
23
unanimously affirmed by the court of appeals.1
The Netherlands A.1 decree upheld by the New York courts in
Anderson was successfully challenged in England. In Bank voor Handel en Scheepvaart N.V. v. Slatford, 4 the English court considered
whether the A.1 decree operated to transfer title to a quantity of gold
from a Dutch bank to the Netherlands Government. 2 The bank,
which had retained its commercial domicile in the Netherlands during
enemy occupation, had deposited the gold in London before the war16
The Dutch bank brought suit to recover damages for the defendant's
alleged conversion of the gold during the time title to the gold had
been purportedly held by the Netherlands Government pursuant to
the A.1 decree. 2 7 The English Board of Trade had mistakenly transferred the gold to the defendant Custodian of Enemy Property for
England and Wales, "28 and then had authorized the custodian to sell
the gold.' 2 If title to the gold during this time had been held by the
Netherlands Government, the sale of the gold by the custodian might
constitute actionable conversion.
The English court stated that under the generally applicable lex
situs rule, a decree of a foreign government was not effective to transfer property situated in Britain."" Citing Andersons, and Lorent119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id.
Id.
289 N.Y. at 20, 43 N.E.2d at 507.
Id.
289 N.Y. at 20, 43 N.E. 2d at 507.
[1953] 1 Q.B. 248.
Id.
Id. at 251.
Id. at 253.
Id. at 251.
Id. at 257.
Three considerations were advanced in support of this rule. First, in the con-

131.

Footnote 131 appears on page 384.
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zen, 132 the plaintiff bank argued that the decree should be enforced
notwithstanding the result mandated by the lex situs rule. 3 Plaintiff
maintained that an exception to the lex situs rule was justified by policy concerns implicated in "decrees of an allied Power in respect of the
property of its nationals made in this country with the approval or at
least the acquiescence of His Majesty's Government with a view to
keeping property out of the hands of a common enemy."'"" Characterizing Anderson'3 5 as "a dangerous precedent,"13 6 the court declared
that "[p]ublic policy appears to be in the hands of the New York
courts a more flexible instrument than it is in this country."' 137 The
court dismissed Lorentzen' as an anomalous decision requiring courts
to make political judgments. 3 " Citing a distinction between public policy and political policy, 40 the court stated:
No doubt one could formulate a broad rule of public policy
that allied governments should be assisted in time of war. But
the extent to which a particular decree serves that end seems
to me to be entirely a matter for political decision by the Government of the day, which would have to consider whether all
its provisions or some or none fitted in with their war policy. A
power at war is not bound to regard everything that its allies
do as politically desirable.'"
Thus rejecting public policy as a ground of decision, the court applied
the lex situs rule to hold the A.1 decree ineffective in England and find
struction of statutory language, unless contrary intent is clear, an Act of Parliament
would generally not be construed as intended to have extraterritorial effect. Second, the
principle is in harmony with Britain's general preference for choice of law rules rooted in
the territoriality theory. Third, if extraterritorial effect were to be given to foreign property legislation, English law affecting the same subject matter would have to be rejected.
Id. at 258.
131. Id. at 265-66.
132. Id. at 260.
133. Id. at 264. For a discussion of the lex loci rules, see supra note 2.
134. [1953] 1 Q.B. at 264.
135. 289 N.Y. 9, 43 N.E.2d 502 (1942), aff'g mem., 263 A.D. 705, 31 N.Y.S.2d 194
(N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't), aff'g, 28 N.Y.S.2d 547 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1941).
136. [1953] 1 Q.B. at 266.
137. Id.
138. [1942] 2 K.B. 202.
139. [1953] 1 Q.B. at 266-67. "If foreign legislation is as a general rule to be admitted,
it would have to be excluded when politically harmful; and the difficulty of formulating
any satisfactory principle of exclusion is in my view a formidable argument against the
validity of the rule." Id.
140. Id. at 264-65 (citing Monkland v. Jack Barclay Ltd., [1951] 2 K.B. 252).
141. [1953] 1 Q.B. at 265.
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the custodian's action not subject to challenge. 4"
The argument that policy assessments are political judgments unsuited for decision by the judiciary is not unknown in United States
jurisprudence. In the original version of his choice of law theory, Professor Currie claimed that "assessment of the respective values of the
competing legitimate interests of two sovereign states, in order to determine which is to prevail, is a political function of a very high order.
This is a function that should not be committed to courts in a democracy."" Currie suggested that courts should avoid undertaking this
legislative task by resolving conflict of laws questions in favor of the
forum whenever the forum had a reasonable basis for applying its own
law.14 4 Currie later developed the theory of the more moderate, restrained and enlightened forum which, upon finding an apparent conflict of laws, would take a second look and might altruistically
subordinate forum self-interest in the face of foreign interests in order
to minimize conflicts problems and advance the establishment of a stable legal order. 4s In this later formulation, Currie "permits and expects courts to apply foreign laws even in the presence of a legitimate
forum interest.""114
With most courts and modern conflict of laws scholars embracing
some form of interest balancing analysis,"' 7 it is inevitable that courts
will continue to assign policy values to rate those interests. The fundamental question is not whether courts will make public policy deci142. Id. at 267.
143. B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 182 (1963). Currie states
that it would be especially improper for a court in a conflicts situation to hold the policy
or interest of the forum inferior to that of a foreign state. His premise is that courts are
ill-equipped to handle legislative policy choices; they "cannot perform effectively, for
they lack the necessary resources." Id. Arguing against weighing and balancing conflicting state interests, Currie states that "[tihis is a job for a legislative committee, and
determining the policy to be formulated on the basis of the information assembled is a
job for a competent legislative body." Id. Currie also asserted that the "rational pursuit
of self-interest is preferable to such irrational (self sacrificing) altruism." B. CURRIE,
supra note 143, at 191.
144. A. EHRENZWEIG, 1 PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 62 (1967) (discussing at 357-58 B.
CURRIE, supra note 143). Currie acknowledged that "[i]f the court finds that the forum
state has an interest in the application of its policy, it should apply the law of the forum,
even though the foreign state also has an interest in the application of its contrary policy, and a fortiori, it should apply the law of the forum if the foreign state has no such
interest." B. CURRIE, supra note 143, at 184.

145.

A.

EHRENZWEIG,

supra note 144, at 65.

146. Id. Ehrenzweig observes that Currie later accepted altruism "if that interest can
be construed in 'restraint and moderation,' as a long-range 'enlightened self interest,'
'altruistically' inducing regard for another state's competing interests." Id. at 65 (quoting
B. CURRIE, supra note 143, at 191).
147. See Ehrenzweig, supra note 8.
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sions, but whether those policy decisions will be obscured by an opaque
application of choice of law rules or openly analyzed and discussed
within the framework of a structured public policy exception.
Although courts appear to have failed in developing a disciplined
public policy approach, a structured public policy concept that incorporates a transnational interest element is not entirely foreign to the
United States. The executive branch of the United States Government
has implicitly recognized the ordre public universel concept in relation
to a transnational interest. In its remarks relating to a preliminary
draft of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of
Cultural Property,14 8 the United States took the following position:
It is one thing to seek international cooperation for the recovery and return of stolen art treasures of national importance,
or to stem a flood of exports that threatens seriously to damage
the cultural heritage of a people. It is quite another thing to
expect States to enforce foreign laws that could lead to the
elimination of all significant international movement of art objects of cultural importance and thus diminish the cultural experience of all people. . . . The United States does not rule
out appropriate international cooperation in the enforcement
of reasonable regulations controlling the export of cultural
property in cases of demonstrated gravity. However, the
United States would be reluctant to agree in advance to undertake this responsibility for any and all export systems of unknown character and scope. " 9
The United States, while acknowledging that a transnational interest
in cultural property is worthy of recognition (ordre public universel),150
added a caveat that not all foreign laws (ordre public interne' and
52
will necessarily be deemed to be of
ordre public international)'
transnational dimension.
As noted earlier, " the choice of law analysis in Elicofon would
have been clarified by such careful delineation of the issues. Instead,
the court relied on the mechanistic lex situs rule' 5" which can be read148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

823 U.N.T.S. 231 (adopted Nov. 14, 1970).
UNESCO Doc. SHC/MD/5 Annex 1 (1970).
See supra notes 88-142 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 54-87 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 17-34 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
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ily applied without analysis. The remarks of the United States representative to the UNESCO Convention" 5 also illuminate a prime reason
for courts, rather than legislatures, to make the discriminating decisions inherent in public policy oriented choice of law analysis. The
United States would never agree in advance to enforce any and all foreign export control systems regardless of their provisions and purposes.
156 Similarly, a legislative decision regarding what public policy interests may be recognized for choice of law purposes could not possibly
interests and fact configurations
anticipate the unknown public policy
15 7
that would arise in future cases.
The rare cases in which a transnational interest is recognized for
public policy reasons,"'8 such as Anderson,1 9 indicate that courts will
employ public policy as a factor in choice of law analysis at least when
the particular facts of a case would lead to an egregious result if public
policy concerns were ignored. This fact may indicate that courts do not
have any principled objections to public policy analysis, but are indisposed to perform such analysis except in egregious cases. The adoption
of a public policy concept structured to reflect the sources and effects
of public policy as a factor in choice of law analysis would delineate
and clarify the respective roles of the public policy exception. Such
clarification could lead to a more probing choice of law analysis that
would facilitate judicial identification and recognition of transnational
interests.
C. Positive Selection Role of Public Policy
The analysis of competing interests, with regard for public policy
concerns, will never be reduced to an exact science. Differentiation of
60
policies, ordre public international6 ' policies
ordre public interne'
and ordre public universel 62 policies would, however, provide an analytical framework within which courts and prospective litigants could
155. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
156. Id.
157. See, e.g., Reese, Book Review, 16 U. TORONTO L.J. 228, 232 (1965) (reviewing B.
CURRIE, supra note 147). Reese states:
Only a court can tailor its decision to the needs of a particular case, and only by
proceeding on a case-to-case basis can there be hope of ultimately developing
If the job is to be done at all, it must be
satisfactory rules of choice of law ....
done by the courts.
Id.
158. See supra notes 103-23 and accompanying text.
159. 289 N.Y. at 9, 43 N.E.2d at 502.
160. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 54-87 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 88-142 and accompanying text.
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assess and better comprehend the role and effect of public policy in
choice of law analysis. Judicial choice of law decisions would be clarified and could escape characterization as being parochial if choice of
law questions were resolved by discussing and carefully considering the
sources of the interests involved, and the respective effects that may be
appropriately assigned to those interests. An integral aspect of this approach is that the weighing of interests would not be impeded or limited by a preconceived refusal to grant full recognition to foreign policy
interests.10 8 In short, courts would avoid the incomplete and parochial
analysis that endows forum policy with power to override foreign interests, but is disinclined to grant reciprocal power to foreign or transnational interests.
Scholarly discussion of the effects of the operation of the ordre
64
public concepts has failed to overcome a certain forum bias. Szaszey
suggests that the principle of public policy in choice of law analysis
may have a threefold effect: negative, positive and transforming. 6 5 The
negative effect consists simply in "precluding the application of a foreign legal rule which conflicts with the public policy of the forum."'166
The positive effect may itself have three functions: the precluded foreign legal provision will be replaced (1) "by another rule of the same
foreign law" (e.g., if the precluded foreign provision appears as an exception under a more general provision), (2) "by a rule of the domestic
law," or (3) "by a provision of a third legal system.' 6 7 The transforming effect "operates to modify the foreign law so as to exclude the elements found objectionable to the forum."' 68 These three categories of
effects all result in the preclusion of otherwise applicable foreign law
that is deemed unsatisfactory by the internal, domestic standards of
the forum. Szaszey does, however, acknowledge that "in exceptional
cases" the forum may take foreign policy into consideration.' 69
163. See supra note 36.
164.

I. SZASZEY, supra note 65.

165. Id. at 98.
166. Id.
167. Id.

168. Id.
169. Id. at 99. Szaszey provides, without explanation, several instances when foreign
policy should be respected:
(a) in the event of a conflict between conflict rules of the second degree (for
example, in the event of renvoi) the foreign conflict rule has to be applied, the
principle of public policy being part and parcel of the foreign conflict law; (b)
the safeguard of the foreign substantive legal situation actually and definitively
developed on the ground of a third legal order, and not on that of either the lex
fori or lex causae, calls for recourse to foreign public policy. In this case the
domestic public policy will insist on the consideration of the foreign public pol-
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A public policy exception that comprehends the ordre public
universel" ° concept would require courts to recognize transnational interests as factors in choice of law analysis which may properly direct
the use of otherwise inapplicable foreign law. This public policy exception would consist of two elements: (1) public policy would be used to
select otherwise inapplicable foreign law rather than to preclude otherwise applicable foreign law; and (2) the foreign law would be selected
for application not merely to advance domestic self-interest but rather
to defer to the transnational interest implicated.
The facts in Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon'7' provide
an example of how this structured analysis would operate. In Elicofon,
the district court failed to recognize Germany's interest in the artworks
representing "the most important pieces of art" and "the most valuable possessions of the Land of Thuringia.' 1 72 The court's choice of law
calculus should have balanced this interest against New York's interest
in adjudicating the validity of a New York resident's claim of title to
property situated in New York.1 73 Even if the New York interest prevailed after ordinary interest analysis, the court should have further
considered whether the interest in preserving and protecting cultural
property was sufficiently implicated so as to give rise to a public policy
exception to ordinary choice of law analysis. As an interest of transnational dimensions,'" 4 the interest in preserving and protecting cultural
property gives rise to an ordre public universel exception that overrides ordinary choice of law analysis.' 71 New York's interest was primarily based on the fact that the paintings were situated in New
York.'17 6 This is a purely domestic interest of the ordre public interne
category.'77 The ordre public universel exception overrides the narrow
choice of law rule which recognizes New York's fortuitous contacts
icy; (c) the judge of the forum has to take into consideration the rules of a third
legal system associated with the legal relations which, in the opinion of the
judge, call for absolute application, because the fact defined by the legal rules,
wholly or in its essential parts, materializes in the social sphere of the legislator
who has enacted the rules in question; (d) the vital political interests of the
home state insist on the consideration of the foreign public policy, provided
these have to be respected.
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with the paintings as a more substantial interest than Germany's interest in having its law govern the determination of ownership of vital
artworks stolen from Germany.
With the adoption of a structured concept of public policy, courts
would be able to analyze and delineate the sources and effects of the
policy considerations that serve as criteria in the choice of law process.
The public policy exception would cease to be a platitude and would
become a viable alternative to applying hoary, mechanistic choice of
independent and isolaw rules formulated when nations were far 17more
8
lated from each other than they are today.
CONCLUSION

The current conception of public policy as a factor in choice of law
analysis has been rightfully maligned for its opacity. Differentiation of
the purposes, sources and effects of the public policy exception would
provide the analytical framework for a policy oriented choice of law
analysis that would recognize transnational interests. The European
ordre public concepts provide a blueprint for this policy analysis. Until
a structured public policy exception is adopted, transnational interests
will continue to suffer subordination to nationalistic public policy and
antiquated choice of law rules.
David Clifford Burger
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